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THE PUBLIC RIGHT-TO-KNOW  
ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS:  
STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
BRIAN REILLY* 
Abstract: Enforcing environmental laws does not immediately appear to be fun-
damentally inconsistent with maintaining national security. Many people have 
criticized the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, however, 
as potentially placing American citizens at risk of a terrorist attack. This Note 
discusses the difficulties associated with striking the balance between giving citi-
zens access to important environmental information while limiting terrorists’ 
ability to misuse that same information. Although this issue is a difficult one on 
its own, it is compounded by recent developments affecting standing in environ-
mental citizen suits. This Note argues that even if the proper balance is struck 
with regard to releasing environmental information to the public, it is still unlike-
ly that an average citizen would be able to pass the high standing barrier and suc-
cessfully bring a citizen suit. The Note then proposes two alternative solutions, 
each of which could potentially strike a better balance between promoting envi-
ronmental protection and preventing terrorist attacks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Do you know what kinds of dangerous chemicals are being used by busi-
nesses in your town, and do you have a plan to respond if those chemicals are 
ever leaked accidentally? Although people rely on the services provided by fac-
tories, water treatment plants, power plants, and other large scale polluters on a 
daily basis, they might not understand the kinds of environmental risks that haz-
ardous chemical leaks pose to citizens, loved ones, and homes.1 To combat the 
dearth of publicly available information about the kinds, quantities, and danger-
ousness of chemicals used by polluters, Congress has passed a number of “right-
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Comment Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–
2014. 
 1 Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Revaluating, Reforming, and Implementing the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 343–
47 (2004). 
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to-know” statutes.2 In theory, at least, these statutes allow citizens to discover 
important information about the chemicals being used in their communities.3 
Unfortunately, the current state of environmental law makes it incredibly 
difficult for citizens to gain access to this important environmental infor-
mation.4 Moreover, even if citizens manage to acquire the information, recent 
jurisprudence has made it almost impossible for citizens to act on the infor-
mation by bringing citizen suits against polluters.5 This Note explains the 
background and history of right-to-know laws and the citizen suit provisions 
included in those laws.6 It then explains the current state of the law, focusing 
on the way the current framework negatively affects citizens and the environ-
ment.7 Finally, this Note provides two solutions that would allow citizens to 
regain control of their neighborhoods and hold polluters accountable.8 
I. RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS 
A. The Freedom of Information Act 
President Lyndon B. Johnson first signed the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) in 1966.9 The Act exists because Congress recognized that public dis-
closure of information is vital to citizens’ participation in government.10 FOIA 
requires all federal agencies to make specific pieces of information— such as 
final opinions, policy statements, administrative manuals and instructions to 
staff that affect the public, copies of all records, and a general index of rec-
ords— available to all citizens for inspection and copying.11 Once an agency 
has made a decision to comply with or deny a request, it must notify the re-
questing person of its decision and the reasons for the decision.12 
Although some agencies might not comply immediately in some instanc-
es, FOIA’s aim is to give citizens access to information in an easy and efficient 
                                                                                                                           
 2 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (2006). 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 11044. 
 4 See infra notes 102–189 and accompanying text. 
 5 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998); Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co. (Steel 
Company I), 90 F.3d 1237, 1245 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Atlantic States Legal 
Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 6 See infra notes 9–101 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 102–189 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 190–239 and accompanying text. 
 9 Remarks on Signing the Freedom of Information Act, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 895 
(July 4, 1966). 
 10 Exec. Order No. 13,392, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,373 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
 11 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2012). 
 12 Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
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manner.13 Despite this clear goal, there are various exceptions within FOIA and 
explicit exemptions promulgated by Congress.14 
Exemption 1 of FOIA states that FOIA requirements do not apply to mat-
ters that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”15 
As per Exemption 1, the federal government has promulgated an Executive Or-
der describing the kinds of national security information exempted from public 
disclosure under FOIA.16 There have been amendments altering the scope of 
Exemption 1 over the past thirty-five years.17 President Barack Obama signed 
the most current Executive Order concerning Exemption 1 in 2009.18 The Or-
der sets standards for classifying and declassifying sensitive national security 
information.19 The Order shows that the government recognizes both the rights 
of the public to be informed about the activities of its government and the need 
to protect national security information from untimely disclosure.20 
After acknowledging the need for a balance between public disclosure 
and national security, the Order goes on to list eight categories of information 
that may be subject to classification for national security reasons.21 These cat-
egories are: foreign government information; vulnerabilities of systems and 
projects; intelligence activities, sources and methods; cryptology; foreign rela-
tions activities; military plans; scientific, technological, and economic matters 
relating to national security; and government programs dealing with nuclear 
material.22 
B. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
1. EPCRA’s Origin, Purpose, and Specific Provisions 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).23 Congress began writing EPCRA in response 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See id. § 552(a)(4)(A); see, e.g., Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 
157 (2004) (exploring the need for a balancing of public and private interests before granting a FOIA 
request). 
 14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 15 Id. § 552(b)(1). 
 16 Id. § 552(b); Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg 707 (Jan. 5, 2010). 
 17 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg 707; Exec. Order No. 12,958, as amended, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 13,292 (Mar. 28, 2003). 
 18 Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg 707. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (2006); Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 324. 
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to several large-scale toxic chemical leaks that occurred around 1984.24 In the 
most notorious incident, a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India accidentally 
released a large quantity of hazardous chemicals.25 The release caused thou-
sands of deaths and numerous injuries.26 Because lawmakers feared that many 
American towns would have inadequate response plans for accidental releases 
like the one in Bhopal, they created EPCRA as a means of forcing towns to 
create such plans.27 
EPCRA utilizes three key strategies for decreasing the dangers of chemi-
cal releases in American towns.28 First, EPCRA mandates that all states must 
have State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and that all Emergen-
cy Planning Districts (EPDs) must have Local Emergency Planning Commit-
tees (LEPCs) that will be responsible for creating and implementing response 
plans.29 Second, the Act requires parties using or storing more than a threshold 
amount of specific chemicals to provide the public with information about the 
chemicals and give notice of any accidental releases.30 Third, EPCRA has a 
citizen suit provision, and any party that fails to comply with EPCRA can be 
subject to heavy fines and other penalties.31 
a. State Emergency Response Commissions and Local Emergency Planning 
Committees 
Understanding the complexity of the EPCRA framework is essential to 
understanding why cutbacks in right-to-know laws have made it incredibly 
difficult for citizens to gain access to vital environmental information.32 Under 
EPCRA, the governor of each state appoints a SERC.33 The SERCs must des-
ignate EPDs within their respective states.34 The SERC must also appoint an 
LEPC for each EPD.35 The LEPC is the group tasked with creating and im-
plementing an emergency response plan for the EPD.36 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Steel Company I, 90 F.3d at 1238–39. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11004, 11022. 
 29 Id. §§ 11001, 11003. 
 30 Id. §§ 11002, 11004, 11022, 11023, 11044. 
 31 Id. §§ 11044–11046. 
 32 See Katherine Chekouras, Balancing National Security with a Community’s Right-to-Know: 
Maintaining Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA’s Non-Preemption Clause, 
34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2007); Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 326–28. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (2006). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. § 11003. 
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 The emergency response plan must include a wide variety of information 
about local facilities, including a list of facilities within the EPD that are sub-
ject to EPCRA, likely transportation routes for extremely hazardous substanc-
es, and a list of facilities that are at increased risk due to their proximity to 
EPCRA facilities.37 The plan must also lay out the emergency procedures to be 
followed by facility owners and emergency personnel in response to an acci-
dental release.38 In addition to this bureaucratic work, the LEPC is responsible 
for creating methods to determine when a leak has occurred and developing 
appropriate response, training, and evacuation plans in the event of a release.39 
Despite the numerous responsibilities, LEPCs have been largely successful in 
creating and implementing emergency response plans.40 
b. Public Disclosure and the Notice Requirement 
Congress passed EPCRA to require facilities possessing, storing, or using 
chemicals in excess of established thresholds to report their chemical use and 
give notice of accidental releases in a timely manner.41 When a release occurs, 
the facility owner must give notice of the chemical released, whether it is listed 
as an extremely hazardous chemical, the quantity released, the duration of the 
release, the medium into which the release occurred, potential health risks as-
sociated with the released chemical, and proper precautions to take.42 
In addition to giving timely notice of accidental releases, facilities subject 
to EPCRA must also complete three different forms for each listed chemical 
possessed, used, or stored by the facility.43 The facility must give a copy of 
each of these forms to the SERC, LEPC, and local fire department.44 If a citi-
zen requests copies, the facility must also make the forms available.45 
Of these three forms, the inventory form contains information most rele-
vant to the public.46 The inventory form can contain two different kinds of in-
formation, labeled Tier I information and Tier II information.47 Tier I infor-
mation includes estimates of the maximum amounts of hazardous chemicals 
present at the facility, estimates of daily amounts present, and the general loca-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Steel Company I, 90 F.3d at 1239. 
 41 42 U.S.C. § 11004. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. §§ 11021, 11023, 11044. 
 44 Id. § 11022. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. § 11022. 
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tion of the hazardous material within the facility.48 Tier II information must 
only be given on request from a member of the public and is more specific 
than Tier I information.49 Tier II information includes all Tier I information as 
well as specific chemical names, a description of the manner in which the 
chemicals are stored, and the exact location of the chemicals in the facility.50 
Both Tier I and Tier II information are available to the public, though some 
Tier II information will only be released if the request is accompanied by an 
explanation regarding why the information is needed.51 Widespread publica-
tion of Tier II information has raised the most concerns regarding national se-
curity, and therefore such publication has been curtailed.52 
2. The Rollbacks 
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, it has become more difficult for 
citizens to obtain sensitive environmental information under right-to-know stat-
utes such as EPCRA.53 Facility owners may refuse to publicly disclose the exact 
location of chemicals, even after receiving a Tier II information request.54 More-
over, due to the national security exemption in FOIA, the federal government 
can choose to classify any information that it believes will create a national secu-
rity risk.55 It is within the purview of the federal government (under Exemption 
1 of FOIA) to prevent disclosure of the type and nature of chemicals being used, 
possessed, and stored at facilities around America.56 Although the intention is to 
protect national security, limiting access to EPCRA information might have the 
effect of worsening any accidental releases that take place.57 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. § 11022(d)(1). 
 49 Id. § 11022. 
 50 Id. § 11022(d)(2). 
 51 Id. § 11022(e)(3). Although theoretically available to the public, these documents can be diffi-
cult to obtain for various reasons. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a); Internet Posting of Chemical “Worst Case” Scenarios: A Road Map 
for Terrorists: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Health and Environment and Oversight and 
Investigation of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 41 (1999) (statement of E. James Moni-
han, National Volunteer Fire Council, that posting information online allows terrorists to engage in 
one-stop shopping); Chekouras, supra note 32, at 124; THOMAS C. BEIERLE, THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT RIGHT-TO-
KNOW? 1, 3–5 (2003), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-03.05.pdf and http://perma.
cc/YYD3-XMTZ. 
 53 See Chekouras, supra note 32, at 123–25; Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental 
Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 106–07 (2007). 
 54 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (2006). 
 55 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
 56 Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg 707. 
 57 Babcock, supra note 53, at 146; see infra notes 190–239 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Clean Air Act 
1. Information Requirements 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) was enacted in 1963 in response to a growing 
awareness of air pollution and its attendant health affects throughout the coun-
try.58 Specifically, Congress recognized that the United States was becoming 
increasingly urban, that this increase in urbanization and industrialization was 
leading to “mounting dangers to the public health and welfare,” and that con-
trolling air pollution is primarily the responsibility of state and local govern-
ment.59 
In an effort to accomplish the goals of reducing air pollution, enhancing 
air quality, and thereby improving public health, Congress, through the CAA, 
implemented a complex permitting and reporting process.60 The statute works 
by implementing various standards for quantities and kinds of pollutants that 
may be emitted by stationary sources (factories and power plants) into an ar-
ea.61 The CAA labels geographic areas with pollutant levels below the given 
standards as attainment areas for a given pollutant, while it labels those above 
the standards as non-attainment.62 The ultimate goal of the CAA is to keep at-
tainment areas at attainment levels while simultaneously bringing non-
attainment areas into attainment.63 
2. Off-Site Consequence Assessments 
To ensure the highest possible degree of public safety, the CAA requires 
that “the owner or operator of stationary sources at which a regulated sub-
stance is present in more than a threshold quantity . . . prepare and implement a 
risk management plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases of 
such substances.”64 These risk management plans (RMP) must be filed with a 
local administrator and are designed to allow for a quick and efficient emer-
gency response to protect the health of surrounding citizens.65 
                                                                                                                           
 58 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. § 7412. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. § 7407. 
 63 See id. Any given area can simultaneously be classified as an attainment area in regard to some 
pollutants and a non-attainment area in regard to others. See id. Therefore, the designation “attainment 
area” is granted only as it pertains to specific individual pollutants. See id. 
 64 Id. § 7412(q)(7)(B)(ii). 
 65 Id. § 7412(q)(7)(B)(iii). 
522 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:515 
The RMPs must include a hazard assessment that explores the potential 
release amounts of hazardous air pollutants, the potential harmful health ef-
fects for humans, and the potential for exposure to nearby people.66 After the 
RMP has been created, specific portions of the plan, labeled “off-site conse-
quences analysis information” (OCA) become available to the public.67 OCA 
information is made up of “those portions of a risk management plan, exclud-
ing the executive summary of the plan, consisting of an evaluation of 1 or 
more worst-case release scenarios or alternative release scenarios.”68 Although 
OCA information must be released to all members of the public, there has been 
much debate over how exactly the government should go about releasing the 
information.69 This debate stems from the fact that the CAA requires the Presi-
dent to analyze both the risk of terrorist activity associated with posting the 
OCA information on the Internet, and the benefit of having such information 
readily, publicly available in the event of an accidental release.70 The President 
must then create regulations that minimize these risks while also allowing “ac-
cess by any member of the public to paper copies of off-site consequences 
analysis information for a limited number of stationary sources located any-
where in the United States.”71 Initially the OCA information was publicly 
available through the Internet, but it has been removed due to heightened con-
cerns regarding terrorism.72 
3. New Procedures 
Although OCA information is no longer publicly available through the In-
ternet, it is still possible for individual citizens to access the data under fairly 
rigorous conditions.73 The CAA includes a provision explicitly giving the Pres-
ident the authority to “exempt any stationary source from compliance with any 
standard or limitation under this section for a period of not more than 2 years 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. § 7412(q) (7)(B)(ii)(I). 
 67 Id. § 7412(q)(7)(H)(i). 
 68 Id. § 7412(q)(7)(H)(i)(III) (emphasis added). 
 69 See Chekouras, supra note 32, at 124; Babcock, supra note 53, at 145–47; Beierle, supra note 
52, at 3–5; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 349–50. 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 7412(7)(H)(ii) (2006). 
 71 Id. § 7412(7)(H)(ii)(II)(aa). 
 72 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL SAFETY INFORMATION, SITE SECURITY AND FUELS REGULA-
TORY RELIEF ACT: PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INFORMATION 1–3 
(2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/ocafactsheet.pdf and http://perma.cc/FXE4-
7PUX. 
 73 Id.; see Federal Reading Rooms, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/
content/rmp/readingroom.htm (last updated Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/MRK8-DE4S. 
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. . . [the exemption] may be extended for 1 or more additional periods.”74 At 
least in theory, the President could indefinitely exempt RMPs from being 
filed.75 
Under the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regula-
tory Relief Act, enacted in 1990, the federal government analyzed the risks 
associated with publicly releasing OCA information in paper form and through 
the Internet.76 From the analysis, the government determined that although In-
ternet access to OCA data would help to prevent accidental releases of hazard-
ous air pollutants, it would also increase the likelihood of a deliberate release 
of such pollutants.77 As a result, the government decided to eliminate Internet 
access to OCA data altogether and place specific requirements on accessing 
paper copies.78 
To access paper copies of OCA information, the government requires citi-
zens to visit one of approximately fifty reading rooms located throughout the 
country.79 Some reading rooms are operated by federal EPA offices located in 
each state, while others are run by the Department of Justice.80 Once citizens 
arrive at a reading room, they must show a form of federal or state identifica-
tion and sign a certification sheet.81 After they receive access to documents, 
citizens may not make any photocopies and may only look at ten OCAs out-
side their geographic area per month; they may look at an unlimited number of 
OCAs that affect their local communities.82 Although it is fairly clear that these 
regulations limit the dissemination of sensitive national security information, 
there is a debate on whether the limitations restrict disclosure in a way that 
causes more harm than good.83 
                                                                                                                           
 74 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (i)(4). 
 75 See id. 
 76 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 72, at 1–3. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Federal Reading Rooms, supra note 73. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 72, at 1–3. 
 83 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 107, 124–26; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 323, 343–47; 
Trang T. Tran, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and National Security: 
Restricting Public Access to Location Information of Hazardous Chemicals, 8 ENVTL. L. 369, 387–88 
(2002). 
524 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:515 
D. Critical Response to the Cutbacks 
After September 11th, there have been numerous scholarly articles written 
on the topic of right-to-know laws.84 The vast majority, if not all, of these arti-
cles agree that such laws have been rolled back due to national security fears.85 
Many of these articles focus specifically on the cutbacks in information public-
ly released under EPCRA and the CAA.86 
Some authors argue that fears about national security have led to a de-
crease in publicly available information and support such reductions.87 The 
standard argument follows the reasoning that when people release information 
publicly, especially on the Internet, they lose control of that information.88 As a 
result, there is a higher likelihood that those looking to misuse the information 
(typically for terrorism) will be able to obtain it easily.89 If people can obtain 
environmental information released through right-to-know laws in support of 
their malicious purposes, then they are more likely to carry out those purpos-
es.90 Therefore, releasing environmental information through right-to-know 
laws places America in greater danger of being a target of a terrorist attack 
than if such information were not released.91 These authors generally contend 
that rollbacks in access to information are beneficial to society overall and 
should be implemented broadly.92 
Numerous authors disagree with this position.93 These authors contend 
that limiting the public release of environmental information might actually 
create a greater potential for harm.94 They generally recognize the fact that re-
leasing environmental information publicly will make it more likely that the 
information will be used by people seeking to use it for nefarious purposes.95 
These authors, however, argue that limiting the dissemination of this infor-
mation prevents citizens from becoming involved in protecting their communi-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Chekouras, supra note 32; Babcock, supra note 53, at 106–07; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, 
at 343–47; Tran, supra note 83, at 387–88. 
 85 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 107; Babcock, supra note 53, at 106–07; Durham-Hammer, supra 
note 1, at 326; Tran, supra note 83, at 370. 
 86 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 108; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 335; see Babcock, supra 
note 53, at 106–07. 
 87 Tran, supra note 83, at 387. 
 88 Id. at 380. 
 89 Id. at 382. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 387–88. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Babcock, supra note 53, at 153; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 352. 
 94 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 125; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 356–57. 
 95 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 124; see Babcock, supra note 53, at 106, 110. 
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ties from pollution hazards.96 These authors point to evidence that when citi-
zens are informed about the environmental risks posed to their communities by 
local polluters, total levels of pollution in their neighborhoods tend to de-
crease.97 Moreover, these arguments frequently follow the line of reasoning 
that an informed community might serve a watchdog function and thereby 
force companies to protect their hazardous chemicals more thoroughly.98 In 
turn, these authors argue that there would likely be fewer releases and that it 
would be more difficult for people seeking to do something harmful to suc-
ceed.99 Almost all of these authors argue for some kind of increase in publicly 
available information.100 
Despite the large number of articles discussing the issues related to cut-
ting back the information available through EPCRA for national security rea-
sons, none of these articles give serious consideration to the windfall that these 
cutbacks create for polluters and how the windfall effect is precipitated by the 
death of the environmental citizen suit.101 
II. THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS 
Although rollbacks in right-to-know laws prompted by national security 
concerns are problematic on their own, the issue is compounded by a dimin-
ished ability of citizens to sue polluters.102 While Congress has curtailed access 
to environmental information, the courts have made it more difficult for citi-
zens to bring environmental suits.103 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 125; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 352–53. 
 97 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 125–26; Beierle, supra note 52, at 3–5. 
 98 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 125; Beierle, supra note 52, at 3–5; Babcock, supra note 53, at 
149; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 353. 
 99 See Chekouras, supra note 32, at 124–26; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 355–56. 
 100 Babcock, supra note 53, at 110; Durham-Hammer, supra note 1, at 355. 
 101 Chekouras, supra note 32, at 124–26; Babcock, supra note 53, at 106–07; Durham-Hammer, 
supra note 1, at 343–47. 
 102 See infra notes 190–239 and accompanying text. 
 103 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t (Steel Company II), 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998); 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987); Citizens for a Better 
Env’t v. Steel Co. (Steel Company I), 90 F.3d 1237, 1245 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated 523 U.S. 83 (1998); 
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 478, 478 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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A. Citizen Suits in Environmental Law 
1. History 
A citizen suit provision is a statutory provision that creates a cause of ac-
tion under which a citizen can sue the government or another entity.104 These 
provisions place specific requirements on the circumstances under which a 
citizen can sue as well as the remedies that a citizen may seek.105 For instance, 
many citizen suit provisions have a sixty-day notice requirement whereby citi-
zens must notify both the potential defendant and the EPA of their intent to sue 
sixty days prior to bringing suit.106 Citizen suit provisions may allow for reme-
dies including declaratory relief, temporary and permanent injunctions, mone-
tary damages (to be paid either to the citizen bringing suit or to the treasury), 
and attorney’s fees and costs.107 
The first environmental citizen suit provision appeared in the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).108 Congress subsequently included similar provisions in many other en-
vironmental statutes.109 The first statute under which a large number of people 
successfully brought citizen suits was the Clean Water Act (CWA), as the self-
reporting requirement of the Act made it easy for citizens to spot and litigate vio-
lations.110 These suits gradually gained traction in the courts.111 These gains 
were later undermined by a series of appellate and Supreme Court decisions 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s.112 
2. The Bell Begins to Toll for Environmental Citizen Suits: Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 
When the Supreme Court decided Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation in 1987, it created a precedent that precipitated the ul-
timate erosion of environmental citizen suits.113 In Gwaltney, two environmen-
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tal groups sued a meatpacking company based on allegations that it had violat-
ed the CWA.114 Like the CAA, the CWA requires citizens to give sixty days 
notice to the potential defendant and the EPA before bringing suit.115 The 
group sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, monetary penalties, and at-
torney’s fees.116 
The case presented a unique question for the courts because the plaintiffs 
were suing for violations that were wholly past.117 Gwaltney had brought its 
factory into compliance during the notice period and was no longer in violation 
at the time of the lawsuit.118 Therefore, the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether the language of the CWA conferred jurisdiction over suits for wholly 
past violations of the statute.119 The Court decided that the best reading of the 
phrase “to be in violation” in the Act required “that citizen-plaintiffs allege a 
state of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likeli-
hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.”120 The Court 
then went on to explain that the purpose of the notice requirement was to allow 
violators to come into compliance with the statute and thereby avoid a law-
suit.121 In the Court’s view, to allow citizen suits for wholly past violations 
would undermine the purpose of the notice requirement.122 
Based on this interpretation of the CWA, the Court vacated the lower 
court’s ruling and remanded.123 Because citizens would not be allowed to sue 
for wholly past violations, the only question on remand was whether the com-
plaint contained a good-faith allegation of ongoing violations by Gwaltney.124 
B. Post-Gwaltney Environmental Citizen Suits: EPCRA  
Refuses to Go Down Without a Fight 
1. The 1990 Amendments to the CAA 
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA’s citizen suit provision.125 Prior to 
the 1990 amendments, the citizen suit provision read: “[A]ny person may com-
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mence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . who is al-
leged to be in violation of” an emissions standard or limit, or an order pertain-
ing to a standard or limit.126 The section was amended to include the phrase 
“alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has 
been repeated).”127 In signing the amendments into law, President George 
H.W. Bush declared that this change was meant to codify the Gwaltney deci-
sion.128 Contrary to this declaration, some courts have relied on the plain lan-
guage of the amendments to hold that the reference to past violations was in-
tended to overturn the Gwaltney decision, rather than codify it.129 Under this 
interpretation, citizens have been able to bring citizen suits for wholly past acts 
(assuming there was more than one violation) under the CAA.130 Not all courts 
agree with this interpretation, and as a result some jurisdictions have barred 
lawsuits for wholly past violations under the CAA.131 
2. The EPCRA Cases 
Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), individual citizens, as well as local, state, and federal government, 
have a right to sue facilities and administrators.132 Generally speaking, citizens 
may sue when a facility owner fails to submit any of its required forms.133 
Likewise, if the facility owner submits the forms but the Administrator fails to 
make them public, a citizen may sue.134 
After Gwaltney, there was ambiguity as to whether citizen suits for whol-
ly past violations could be brought under environmental statutes other than the 
CWA.135 The EPCRA citizen suit provision was the subject of multiple law-
suits aimed at deciding whether its language, like the language of the CWA, 
barred citizen suits for wholly past violations.136 This lack of clarity is particu-
larly problematic in a situation such as this one, where the penalties for failing 
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to comply with the statute are extremely high.137 Under EPCRA, a facility 
owner who fails to submit the required forms can be fined up to $25,000 per 
violation.138 Each day that passes is considered a new violation.139 Therefore, it 
is possible for a facility to commit numerous violations in only a few days, 
thus subjecting the facility to large fines.140 
 Whereas the citizen suit provision of the CWA uses the present tense 
(“who is alleged to be in violation”), EPCRA states that a citizen may sue an 
owner, operator, or Administrator for a list of specific violations.141 The grounds 
for a citizen suit include failure to submit a follow-up emergency notice, submit 
a material safety data sheet, complete and submit an inventory form, or complete 
and submit a toxic chemical release form.142 Differing interpretations of 
EPCRA’s language resulted in a circuit split in which the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that citizens could sue for wholly past violations 
while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Gwaltney 
analysis applied to EPCRA’s citizen suit provision.143 Eventually this split made 
its way to the Supreme Court.144  
a. Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical Instruments: The 
Sixth Circuit Strikes the First Blow Against EPCRA Citizen Suits 
In the 1995 case Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical In-
struments, an environmental group, the Atlantic Legal States Foundation 
(ASLF), sued an instrument manufacturer called United Musical Instruments 
(UMI).145 ASLF alleged that UMI had failed to file forms required by EPCRA 
for several years.146 Prior to filing suit, and in compliance with the notice re-
quirement in the citizen suit provision of EPCRA, ASLF gave UMI sixty days 
notice.147 During the notice period, UMI filed all of the EPCRA forms that it 
had failed to file from 1988 through 1991.148 Once the notice period passed, 
ASLF brought suit alleging that UMI had failed to timely file its forms and 
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sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees.149 UMI filed a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that at the time ASLF’s complaint was filed, UMI had 
cured any EPCRA violations by completing and filing the necessary forms.150 
At trial the district court found for UMI on the grounds that the suit was 
barred by the statute of limitations.151 The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different 
grounds.152 The Sixth Circuit found that based on the plain language of the 
statute, the analysis was the same as in Gwaltney.153 It also focused on the fact 
that EPCRA allows citizen suits when an owner fails to file its forms; here, 
though the forms were not filed in a timely manner, they had nonetheless been 
filed before suit commenced.154 
b. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co.: The Seventh Circuit 
Fights Back 
In the 1996 case Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., an envi-
ronmental group, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), sued a steel manu-
facturing and pickling company.155 The allegations and facts involved in 
CBE’s claim were all but identical to those in the United Musical Instruments 
case.156 In 1995, CBE discovered that Steel Company had failed to file its nec-
essary EPCRA reports for several years.157 CBE, in accordance with the citizen 
suit provision of EPCRA, gave notice to both Steel Company and the EPA of 
its intent to sue.158 During the sixty-day notice period, Steel Co. filed all of its 
outstanding reports.159 Then, at the end of the sixty day notice period CBE 
commenced suit.160 
The district court applied the reasoning of United Musical Instruments 
and Gwaltney and dismissed the case.161 CBE appealed to the Seventh Cir-
cuit.162 Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the similarities between 
United Musical Instruments and the Steel Company case, it chose not to adopt 
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the explicit reasoning of either the Sixth Circuit in United Musical Instruments 
or the Supreme Court in Gwaltney.163 Instead, it decided to apply the “interpre-
tative methodology” used to analyze the CWA in Gwaltney to the EPCRA citi-
zen suit provision.164 
Under this analysis the Seventh Circuit stated that “the language of 
EPCRA differs from the language interpreted in Gwaltney; EPCRA authorizes 
citizens to sue ‘for failure to’ comply with the statute while the Clean Water 
Act authorized citizen suits where a defendant was alleged ‘to be in viola-
tion.’”165 Keeping this distinction in mind, the Seventh Circuit focused on the 
fact that EPCRA uses past tense language, while the CWA uses the present 
tense throughout.166 The court emphasized that since Gwaltney, Congress had 
amended the CAA’s citizen suit provision to allow wholly past violations while 
maintaining the sixty-day notice provision.167 Finally, the court stated that re-
fusing to allow citizen suits for wholly past violations places the costs of litiga-
tion on environmental groups and creates incentives for polluters to remain 
non-compliant with EPCRA.168 Based on all of these considerations, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that citizen suits for wholly past violations under EPCRA 
were appropriate.169 
c. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment: The Supreme Court 
Connects with a Knockout Blow Against EPCRA 
As a result of the split between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Su-
preme Court decided to hear Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment in 1998.170 Prior to considering the substantive merits of the Steel Com-
pany case, the Supreme Court identified two potential preliminary issues.171 
These issues were whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue and whether the 
EPCRA citizen suit provision permitted the cause of action for wholly past 
violations.172 In his majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia began with the 
standing analysis.173 In contrast, Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his con-
curring opinion that because both potential issues were “jurisdictional,” the 
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court could choose which analysis to undertake first; he then proceeded to ex-
amine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.174 
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia first discussed the standard for 
standing: A plaintiff must have an injury in fact, caused by the defendant, that 
is redressable.175 Justice Scalia focused on redressability.176 He stated that even 
if there had been an injury in fact, there would still be no redressability for that 
harm because any penalties would be paid to the treasury, not the plaintiffs.177 
The mere “psychic satisfaction” that the plaintiff would have received from 
seeing the law enforced was not sufficient to establish redressability.178 There-
fore, the plaintiff’s case was dismissed.179 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens came to the same conclusion 
that the case should be dismissed, though he arrived at that conclusion through 
a subject matter jurisdiction analysis.180 According to Justice Stevens, “if [the 
EPCRA citizen suit provision] authorizes citizen suits for wholly past viola-
tions, the district court has jurisdiction over these actions; if it does not, the 
court lacks jurisdiction.”181 He ultimately followed the reasoning in Gwaltney 
and stated that EPCRA failed to give courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
cases alleging wholly past violations of the EPCRA citizen suit provision.182 
C. Critical Responses to the Combined Effects of  
Gwaltney and Steel Company 
Much like the responses to the cutbacks in right-to-know laws, the critical 
response in the aftermath of Gwaltney, United Musical Instruments, and Steel 
Company had two poles.183 On one hand, there are numerous articles criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court’s Steel Company decision.184 These authors generally 
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favor the approaches that are not as restrictive of citizen suits.185 They essen-
tially argue that the Supreme Court has effectively killed environmental citizen 
suits, as it is now almost impossible for a citizen plaintiff to pass the high 
standing threshold in an EPCRA suit.186 
On the other side, commentators have argued that allowing environmental 
citizen suits for wholly past violations was unnecessarily harsh for polluters.187 
These authors view the Steel Company decision as a step in the right direction 
and approved placing limitations on a citizenry that might otherwise be too 
litigious.188 
Regardless of the argument, none of the literature that has appeared in the 
aftermath of the Steel Company case has commented on the windfall effect that 
the limitation on citizen suits, in combination with the cutbacks in right-to-
know laws, has given to polluters.189 
III. HOW THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK RESULTS IN A  
WINDFALL TO POLLUTERS 
This Part argues that the rise of national security-related cutbacks in ac-
cess to information and judicial checks on citizen suits190 have led to a windfall 
for polluters.191 After examining these problems, this Part proposes two poten-
tial solutions that could help citizens regain the power to defend their commu-
nities from pollution.192 By empowering citizens to protect their communities, 
and giving them the information and legal standing necessary to do so, Con-
gress can help citizens to protect their environments.193 
A. The Cutbacks in Right-to-Know Laws, Combined with the Death of 
Environmental Citizen Suits, Has Created a Windfall for Polluters 
Although recent cutbacks in right-to-know laws and limits placed on the 
ability of citizens to bring environmental suits may not appear to be related, 
the combination of these two, independent trends has created a more polluter-
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friendly environment in America.194 In reducing both the kinds and quantity of 
environmental information that is available to citizens, the right-to-know cut-
backs have made it harder for citizens to fight back against polluters in their 
communities.195 This difficulty has been compounded by citizens’ inability to 
bring suits for wholly past violations under the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).196 
Furthermore, the inability to obtain adequate environmental information makes 
it all but impossible for citizens to meet the standing requirement to sue a pol-
luter for an ongoing violation.197 This analysis explores how these dual hurdles 
impede citizen enforcement and thereby provide a windfall to polluters, and 
then suggests possible solutions.198 
First, if citizens are denied access to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
information that has been exempted for national security reasons under Exemp-
tion 1, then much of the information that would normally be available through 
EPCRA will be taken out of citizens’ reach.199 If citizens are unable to gain ac-
cess to EPCRA information by using a FOIA request, then they will certainly 
struggle to monitor local polluters.200 Moreover, without this important infor-
mation there is a very low likelihood that citizens will be able to satisfy the 
standing requirement.201 How can a citizen allege an injury in fact, caused by a 
polluter, that is redressable if that citizen has little or no access to information 
regarding that polluter’s pollution habits? Assuming that a citizen can get past 
the standing threshold, that citizen will then encounter the prohibition on citizen 
suits for wholly past violations.202 Given the amount of time and effort it may 
take to acquire environmental information, if it can be acquired at all under the 
current framework, it is highly likely that many violations would only be discov-
ered after they were already wholly past.203 
If, despite all these hurdles, a citizen managed to acquire information of 
ongoing violations, the notice provision included in each right-to-know statute 
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would give the polluter sixty days to correct the violation.204 Assuming that the 
polluter does correct its violations (and it is reasonable to think that any so-
phisticated polluter would), the citizen suit would fall into the category of su-
ing for wholly past violations and would therefore be outside a court’s jurisdic-
tion under Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.205 
Second, under the current Clean Air Act (CAA) framework it is very dif-
ficult for any person to acquire environmental information.206 Any person 
wishing to do so must go to a reading room.207 Moreover, although some 
courts have read the CAA to allow citizen suits for wholly past violations, 
there is no definitive decision saying that this is the proper interpretation.208 
Thus, a person’s ability to bring an environmental citizen suit under the CAA 
would hinge on whether that person was fortuitous enough to live in a jurisdic-
tion that interprets the CAA in a favorable manner.209 
Under the current framework, a person would need the time, funds, and 
commitment to travel to a reading room, find information that implicates a pol-
luter, and then happen to be in a jurisdiction that interprets the CAA favora-
bly.210 Even after going through these steps, the citizen would still need to pre-
sent sufficient information to allege an injury in fact, caused by the polluter, 
that is redressable before successfully bringing suit.211 As such, it seems likely 
that under the current framework it would be all but impossible for any but the 
most motivated and well-funded citizens even to begin the undertaking of 
monitoring and suing a polluter.212 Ultimately, the cutbacks in the availability 
of CAA information, combined with the high standard for bringing an envi-
ronmental citizen suit after Steel Company, make it difficult (though still much 
easier than under EPCRA) to bring an environmental citizen suit under the 
CAA.213 
There has been a dramatic decline in the number of citizen suits since the 
1980s.214 It is not clear that there have been any successful environmental citi-
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zen suits brought under EPCRA since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Steel 
Company in 1996.215 Moreover, the CAA reading rooms were used by a total 
of only thirty-three people between 1999 and 2002.216 All of this considered 
together with the present dearth of available environmental information paints 
a bleak picture for the ability of citizens to protect their neighborhoods from 
polluting corporations.217 
B. Implementing Either of Two Proposed Solutions Will  
Remove the Windfall for Polluters and Protect  
National Security and the Environment 
Congress should implement either of two possible solutions to empower 
citizens to fight back against pollution in their communities.218 Both solutions 
would allow citizens to sue for wholly past violations.219 Under the first solu-
tion, Congress would statutorily adopt the reasoning of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit’s Steel Company decision and simultaneously 
amend EPCRA to allow citizens to recover monetary damages.220 Under this 
scenario, the government could continue to take a tough stance on protecting 
sensitive national security information.221 This solution would mimic the mod-
ern-day CAA in that it would give citizens a right to sue for wholly past viola-
tions and would make it possible to meet the redressability prong of the stand-
ing analysis.222 
Under the second solution, however, Congress would not allow citizens to 
recover monetary damages under right-to-know statutes. Instead, it could give 
citizens more access to high quality, accurate environmental information under 
these laws.223 In this way, even though the standing requirements would still be 
high, the larger amount of available information would increase the likelihood 
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of meeting the redressability requirement.224 Under either solution, Congress 
should also seriously consider altering the reading room requirement of the 
CAA to give citizens increased access to important, local environmental in-
formation.225 Both of these solutions would have the desired effect of protect-
ing the public from national security threats while also creating greater latitude 
for citizens to be active participants in protecting their environments.226 
The two proposed solutions arise from the idea that for citizens to be in-
volved in monitoring polluters and bringing lawsuits, they need to either have 
easy and inexpensive access to more environmental information or face a low-
er threshold for bringing successful environmental civil suits.227 Under the first 
solution, which would allow citizens to recover damages under EPCRA, citi-
zens would still have limited access to information, thereby assuaging any na-
tional security concerns.228 Under this framework, citizens would no longer 
have such difficulty satisfying the high standing requirements laid out in the 
Supreme Court’s Steel Company decision, and they would have the additional 
option to sue for wholly past violations.229 Polluters would also know that even 
if information is more difficult for citizens to access, there would still be some 
likelihood of citizens obtaining the information at some point in the future.230 
A violator, therefore, would be forced to comply or risk being punished for its 
noncompliance at some point in the future.231 Likewise, because citizens 
would also be aware of their ability to sue for wholly past violations (and 
could expect to survive a standing analysis), they would likely be more in-
clined to invest the extra time and resources needed to gain access to environ-
mental information under the current framework.232 
The second solution—which would not allow citizens to recover damages 
but would give them greater access to environmental information— would not 
be as effective at protecting sensitive national security information.233 If one 
adopts the view, however, that more information actually leads to safer commu-
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nities, then this framework might do an equal or even better job of preventing 
harm to communities.234 This solution would also appease people who want to 
see citizen suits limited by a high standing threshold.235 It gains its greatest 
strength from the fact that an informed citizenry would necessarily have a great-
er likelihood of acquiring information sufficient to surpass the high standing bar-
rier.236 
As things currently stand, the right-to-know law cutbacks and the death of 
environmental citizen suits have stacked the deck against citizen plaintiffs.237 
They have no viable way to gain easy access to important environmental in-
formation, and even if they did, there is no realistic way for them to bring suc-
cessful citizen suits against infringing polluters.238 There is probably not a one-
size-fits-all solution to this complex problem, but either of the solutions pro-
posed in this Note would be better for citizens, society, and the environment 
than the current system.239 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of affairs in environmental law provides polluters with 
an unwarranted windfall for two reasons. First, rollbacks in publicly available 
information have prevented citizens from becoming informed about the kinds 
of pollution harms that might arise in their communities. Even those citizens 
who actively seek to learn about local polluters are likely to face roadblocks as 
a result of national security concerns. Second, citizens who manage to gather 
information are unable to take a proactive stand to prosecute law-breaking pol-
luters because courts have made it nearly impossible for citizens to take ad-
vantage of many citizen suit provisions. Fortunately, Congress can easily recti-
fy this problem in either of two ways. First, Congress could statutorily allow 
lawsuits for wholly past violations under the Emergency Planning and Com-
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munity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), as it has already (arguably) done under 
the Clean Air Act. Second, Congress could amend EPCRA to allow citizens to 
collect monetary awards for successful suits, thereby alleviating the redressa-
bility issue that currently undermines the standing requirement. By taking ei-
ther of the proposed actions Congress could empower citizens to protect their 
environments through citizen suits and in turn remove the windfall to polluters 
that the current framework facilitates. 
 
  
 
